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Letter From a Dead Man

On a trip to Salgon in 1964, News-WEEK's Pentagon correspondent Lloyd H. Norman met South Vietnamese Col. Pham Ngoc Thao. Last fall, Thao, regarded as a troublesome coup-maker at home, was in effect exiled to the U.S. as the press attaché in Saigon's Washchance to renew his acquaintance with Thao, his wife and their six children. Shortly after Christmas, Thao left his family behind in Washington and surthen a much-wanted fugitive, Thao disappeared. Last week, he was finally run down by security forces and killed. Only the day before, Norman had re-ceived a letter from Thao in the Saigon

Dear Mr. Norman:

a born conspirator-this is an error. I think hard before acting. If Nguyen I would have supported him completely. But he was bad for the country, and I

worked to overth whim. The Amerime tooth and nail, cans initially four but afterward realized that I was right. Washington dreams often, with eyes open, because it bases its actions on reports which though they may be sincere are incorrect. The Vietnamese problem has been poorly understood for the last twenty years, since 1945. If one does ington embassy, thus giving Norman a not begin with the facts of 1965, a good solution will not be found, and the Americans will continue to be always on the wrong side.

A certain form of humanitarian socialfaced briefly in Saigon in February as ism is essential. If you fear this word one of the leaders of an abortive coup socialism, call it what you will. Essenagainst Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh. By tially it is a profound social reform, beginning with agrarian reform.

Politically one must recognize that the resistance against the French colonialists was a nationalistic war. Therefore, one must draw the resistant elements area dated June 4 in which the passion- into the Nationalist government ... One ately patriotic Catholic presented his ought not fear the socialistic or leftist views on why the war against the Viet tendency of these new men. They have Cong is not being won. Some excerpts: the confidence of the people. If the U.S. supports them sincerely, they will reject the Communist camp . . . It is also essen-You could, from afar, think that I am tial that the Americans support a socialist or almost socialist program.

The more airplanes and bombs you Khanh had been truly useful in Vietnam, send, the quicker you will lose the confidence of South Vietnam and of Southeast Asia. In truth Mr. McNamara is a very bad adviser for President Johnson ... He has understood nothing of the problem of Vietnam. I regret to say this, but I believe it strongly.

Do not believe that I work alone in Vietnam. Our group is very strong. If it does not triumph now, it will triumph later. It would be better to lose half of South Vietnam and begin again ... than to continue with a government of mili-k tary chiefs who are completely discredited in the eyes of the people.

The strategy of men like Diem, Khanh? and Quat is always the same: identify the opposition with the Communists. The danger is that the Americans are falling into the trap too, at least for a certain period of time. We are not Communists. We are nationalists, but also socialists ... I am confident that in the end we will triumph and with the aid of the Americans, including the CIA.

My family is poor. Could you please help my wife find a job so she can support the children? Thank you in advance. Col. Pham Ngoc Thao MORI/CDF